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THE DECLARATION OF THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND 
THE WORLD INDIGENOUS MOVEMENT 
Irène Bellier* 
Over the last decade, under the auspices of the Commission on 
Human Rights, indigenous peoples have been associated by the 
United Nations (UN) in the negotiations concerning the Draft 
Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. Even though the 
whole story started with the mobilisation of Northern, Central and 
South Amerindian organisations, which remain extremely active, 
indigenous representatives are now coming from all over the 
world to participate in the annual sessions. Known to be an 
aspirational document, equivalent to the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights and able to protect indigenous collective rights, 
the Draft Declaration is to be adopted through the formation of a 
consensus. Nothing has been adopted yet, and the controversies 
regarding the language of the Draft Declaration, as well as the 
oppositions between state and non-state actors, demonstrate 
that the international identification of a people and the definition 
of collective human rights remain difficult. However, in the last 
three years a series of changes concerning the development of 
indigenous issues have been observed, both in the UN‘s Working 
Group on the Draft Declaration (WGDD) and on the national and 
regional stages where constitutional changes (South America) 
and a reflection on the definition of indigenous issues (Africa, 
Asia) are being introduced. Based on participant observation of 
the process held in the UN, the following article deals with the 
politics of thisnegotiation and analyses the positions of the 
different actors involved and their impact on the development of 
the world indigenous movement. 
The Draft Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples aims at finalising an 
aspirational document to protect the world’s indigenous peoples’ rights to live 
according to their own customs, in their traditional lands and territories, 
situated in states following various forms of colonisation and marginalisation. 
Ten years after the United Nations (UN) Intersessional Working Group for the 
Draft Declaration (WGDD) (1994) began its task of improving the text and 
reconciling the positions between states and indigenous peoples, nothing has 
been adopted, except for two articles which focus on individual rights. The 
basis for a consensual language remains extremely unstable, and the definition 
of collective human rights divides the majority of the states which are party to 
the negotiations. A few states, as well as indigenous organisations with 
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opposing rationales, recently contested the present UN process that does not 
allow for any progress. However, for a number of indigenous organisations 
which signed a petition to renew the mandate of the WGDD in April 2005, a 
momentum has been created that should not be interrupted if indigenous 
peoples want to have a say in their own development.  
The mobilisation started 30 years ago when a massacre of the Yanomami 
in Brazil stimulated the creation of a human rights organisation focusing on 
indigenous issues only in Europe (Survival International and the International 
Working Group for Indigenous Affairs, with their headquarters in London and 
Copenhagen respectively) and in the United States (Cultural Survival, 
Cambridge, MA). With the development of international campaigns and the 
pressure of NGOs, the United Nations, under the auspices of the Commission 
on Human Rights (CHR), decided to launch a process aiming at identifying the 
specific discriminations indigenous peoples suffer in the world, in order to set 
norms and standards appropriate to the defence of extremely vulnerable 
populations which constitute a significant part of the world’s cultural 
diversity.1 The UN system and a family of agencies progressively developed 
these indigenous issues; the human and ecological realities of indigenous 
peoples became better known, with their problems attended to locally, when 
indigenous representatives decided to commit themselves at the UN level. 
They started participating in the working groups (since 1982), as well as 
lobbying for the inclusion of indigenous issues on many world agendas, such 
as sustainable development, cultural diversity, the fight against poverty and 
intellectual property.  
The indigenous peoples succeeded in 2000 in creating the Permanent 
Forum for Indigenous Issues, which is the first permanent structure for non-
state actors created under the auspices of the UN Economic and Social 
Council. This places indigenous issues in the mainstream of a variety of UN 
programs, and gives them greater significance. In parity with the governments 
who appoint their own experts, eight indigenous experts are being elected for 
three years by local, national or regional organisations to represent Europe, 
Asia, Latin America, Central America, North America, Africa and the Pacific. 
A rotating chair is given every three years to Africa, Asia and South America, 
due to their larger indigenous populations. In 2002, a special rapporteur for 
the basic freedoms and human rights of indigenous peoples has been 
nominated — a sign that indigenous problems need special attention within the 
human rights domain. 
The discussions on the Draft Declaration have developed within this 
context, with meetings being held annually in Geneva where most of the UN 
activities regarding the indigenous peoples take place; the Permanent Forum 
sessions are held at the UN’s New York headquarters.  
It is difficult to explain why the language formulated by the five 
international independent experts appointed by the UN Sub-Commission on 
the Promotion and Protection of Minorities for the Working Group on 
Indigenous Populations (WGIP) — who worked in close association with 
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indigenous peoples’ representatives over a nine-year period (1985–94) — 
cannot be accepted by the states who participated in the drafting process. The 
fact is that it represents a political challenge. The current situation seems to 
reflect an impossibility for some states — amongst the most powerful — to 
legitimise the indigenous demands for collective rights as part of human rights 
instruments. 
The present stage of negotiations calls for reflection about two matters. 
The first concerns the importance of the action taken by non-state 
representatives to bring the attention of the international community to the 
specificities of the discrimination that concerns indigenous peoples in the 
places where they try to survive — in the wake of academic discussions on the 
new patterns for collective action and the changing configuration of 
democracy. The second point concerns the capacity to make international 
human rights instruments evolve into something coherent with the needs of 
present populations, which are suffering from regular violations of their rights, 
both as individuals and as belonging to a collective entity. Both matters raise 
the issue of what states’ priorities are for the development of their economies 
and societies in a global world. They also question the nation(s)-to-state 
relationship. This paper deals with two crucial questions relating to the Draft 
Declaration. The first concerns the possibility for the indigenous peoples to be 
recognised as a people, a question that is considered both for its symbolic 
aspect (the international recognition) and its political consequences (the right 
to self-determination). The second concerns the possibility for states to 
recognise collective rights and to transfer property rights on lands, territories 
and resources to sectors of the national society. These two key issues constitute 
the rails the world indigenous movement use to construct and affirm a political 
capacity.2  
The Importance of Recognition as a People 
To understand the current UN context of what seems to be a gridlock, it is 
fruitful to question the founding opposition between states (together with the 
dominant societies) and indigenous peoples. The definition of indigenous 
peoples, as taken from the Martinez Cobo Report on the Specific 
Discriminations Against Indigenous Populations,3 underlines the fact that they 
are: 
peoples and nations who present a historical continuity with society 
prior to the conquest and colonization of their territory and consider 
themselves as different from the other sectors of society which rule 
upon these territories or are part of them. They constitute non-dominant 
sectors of societies and are determined to preserve, protect and transmit 
to the future generations their ancestral lands and ethnic identity, in 
accordance with their own cultural systems, legal systems and social 
institutions. 
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See also the ‘definition’ proposed on the UN website.4 
Indeed, several elements constitute common ground for identifying 
different indigenous peoples all over the world, to distinguish the problems 
confronting them from those facing the national, regional, ethnic or linguistic 
minorities in the 70 or so countries which do have an indigenous presence. The 
difference between being acknowledged as ‘indigenous peoples/populations’, 
‘ethnic/national minorities’, ‘scheduled cast and scheduled tribes’ and not 
being recognised at all — and thus being deprived of any kind of status, rights 
or form of citizenship — is crucial in terms of the destiny of the respective 
populations. It also affects local communities’ opportunities to preserve, 
protect and transmit their culture, knowledge and lands. Dominant in the 
indigenous discourse, no matter where the representative has come from, is the 
wish to transmit the cultural knowledge and the traditional territory (in the 
sense of a body of learning through which young people learn how to live) to 
the next generation, with full respect for the elders.  
Within this background, where so many different statuses can be 
observed, the recognition of indigenous peoples as peoples is most 
controversial. States accept the notion of ‘population’, consistent with the fact 
that states are the disciplinary agents of modern life5 that control populations 
to collect taxes, distribute allocations, define the electoral constituencies, and 
so on. But states are reluctant to admit indigenous communities, systems and 
authorities to be considered as peoples — given that the marginalisation of 
these groups forms the basis for states’ development as dominant societies and 
states. There are many different possible definitions of a people, each of which 
embodies different rights.  
Indigenous peoples’ representatives defend the idea of a self-
identification as a people: ‘I claim to be indigenous and my people recognize 
me as part of them.’ They plead for the recognition to be entitled to their own 
legal, social and political systems, the meaning and functions of which are 
shared by the members of the group/people;6 they plead to be recognised as 
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300 million indigenous peoples in more than 70 countries worldwide. Indigenous 
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cultural, economic and political characteristics that are distinct from those of the 
dominant societies in which they live. Despite their cultural differences, the 
various groups of indigenous peoples around the world share common problems 
related to the protection of their rights as distinct peoples.’ 
5 Foucault (1993). 
6 Article 1, common to the two covenants, states: ‘1. All peoples have the right of 
self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political 
status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development. 2. All 
peoples may, for their own ends, freely dispose of their natural wealth and 
resources without prejudice to any obligations arising out of international 
economic co-operation, based upon the principle of mutual benefit, and 
international law. In no case may a people be deprived of its own means of 
subsistence. 3. The States Parties to the present Covenant, including those having 
responsibility for the administration of Non-Self-Governing and Trust Territories, 
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different from the rest of society by the others, bystates, by local authorities, 
and so on. They fight for their recognition as a people (unqualified and equal 
to any other people) on line with the international meaning of the word as 
proposed by Article 1, common to the two 1966 International Covenants on 
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (ICESCR). 
Different states usually have varying visions of what constitutes a people 
as this term is defined by their Constitution. In the French culture, for instance, 
the Republican meaning of the word acknowledges an abstract unified people 
without difference of gender, colour, religion, race or ethnic affiliation.7 Under 
such a provision, the French constitutionalists block any political attempt to 
transfer parts of the national sovereignty to sectors of the people, and therefore 
deny the possibility of acknowledging the title of ‘a people’ to a particular 
minority like the Corsican or the Guyanese indigenous peoples. The 
Republican state does not recognise national, regional, linguistic or ethnic 
minorities on the French territory (both on the continent and in overseas 
departments), even though it admits differences exist within French society —
it provides some means for training in regional language and supports the 
cultural and religious developments of a variety of social groups. In other 
words, minorities and peoples exist in society and may freely develop in 
private spaces, but they do not enjoy specific rights or constitutional provisions 
in the political order and public space that are centred on the notion of 
citizenship — the basic meaning of which refers to the three words ‘Freedom, 
equality, fraternity’. However, since the violence in New Caledonia led to the 
Noumea Agreement with the Kanak people, this indigenous people living in a 
French overseas department has been engaged in the process of opening the 
lid.8 At the UN, the French delegates, properly instructed by the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs as diplomats usually are, question the notion of ‘a people’ — 
as does the United States, together with a number of other states — and they 
                                                                                                                               
shall promote the realization of the right of self-determination, and shall respect 
that right, in conformity with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations.’ 
7 The 1958 French Constitution, Article 3, states that ‘national sovereignty belongs 
to the people who exerts it through its representatives and the use of referendums. 
No section of the people, no individual can claim to enforce it alone.’ (La 
souveraineté nationale appartient au peuple qui l'exerce par ses représentants et 
par la voie du référendum.  Aucune section du peuple ni aucun individu ne peut 
s'en attribuer l'exercice.) 
8 The Ministry for Overseas Departments states: ‘Colonisation injured the Kanak 
people’s dignity that it has been deprived of its identity … It is necessary to 
remember these difficult times, to recognize the errors, to restitute the Kanak 
people its confiscated identity, which means to recognize its sovereignty, shared in 
a common destiny …’ (la colonisation a porté atteinte à la dignité du peuple 
kanak qu'elle a privé de son identité […] Il convient de faire mémoire en ces 
instants difficiles, de reconnaître les fautes, de restituer au peuple kanak son 
identité confisquée, ce qui équivaut pour lui à une reconnaissance de sa 
souveraineté, partagée dans un destin commun. 
www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/actual/dossiers/ncal.html) 
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refuse to have it inserted expressly in the Draft Declaration. Providing an 
interpretation of the articles which bears upon individual rights, they accept a 
wording like ‘indigenous people and individuals have the right to …’ They 
understand that some collective rights must be defined, particularly to protect 
the world’s cultural diversity (for example, language, culture, spirituality, 
customs, practices), but they oppose the formulation of collective human 
rights. 
Claiming to be a people — part of a collective — is clearly an important 
stance for the individuals, groups and communities who do not recognise 
themselves in the national project that used to define the nation state. It is a 
position that is full of political consequences, and it represents an opportunity 
for indigenous peoples to express their different philosophy of the world, 
based on social organic solidarities and particular relationship with the 
environment.9 It opposes the view developed by the states which primordially 
defend the principle of territorial integrity — and which, on this basis, are 
reluctant to apply the principle of self-determination to sectors of their own 
societies. They stick to the internationally defined human rights principles, 
based on individualism and the differential treatment of the person who can be 
detached from group and family solidarities and so be involved into (and 
protected from) industrial societies’ developments. Through the voices of their 
representatives in the UN forums, indigenous peoples do not oppose individual 
human rights mechanisms, but consider that these do not protect them — and 
the list of violations presented to the UN Human Rights Committee in Geneva 
each year is seemingly endless.  
The human rights issue is linked to an ideological position and political 
manipulations. Generalisation is inappropriate to clear the political distinctions 
that cross the world indigenous movement and the states, but the observation 
of the two working groups in Geneva allows for the identification of some 
headlines. On the one hand, indigenous peoples oppose capitalism — the 
dominant system on which modern societies are developing without any 
alternative model since the fall of the Soviet regime. They especially oppose 
the fact that capitalism is based on private property and the promotion of 
individualist principles. A criticism of capital is re-emerging in different places 
and periods, currently through the anti-globalisation movement, in a way that 
is sympathetic to indigenous battles and the ideas that indigenous peoples have 
about sustaining development. Globally, it contributes to a kind of acceptance 
of the desire to foster a bigger harmony with ‘Mother Earth’ — a mythic 
character that indigenous peoples from all continents have adopted to show to 
the rest of the world the specificity of their relationship with their lands and 
territory, both material and spiritual. These claims sustain a relative 
mobilisation for defining collective rights to protect indigenous peoples as 
cultural entities in a process that leads toward their political recognition as 
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peoples, since most of them never agreed to become subalterns or 
subordinated.10 
On the other hand, the states — especially the United States and the 
European countries — recall that history cannot be obliterated. Even though 
the marginalisation of aboriginal populations has unfortunately occurred in all 
the continents on the wake of colonisation, these states remind us that a system 
had to be developed and adopted by the international community for protecting 
individuals against discrimination based on ethnic belonging — especially 
after the Holocaust. That leads some states to contest the notion of collective 
human rights (the Anglo-Saxon countries) and push them to protect individuals 
from what they perceive as leading to communitarianism and fragmentation 
(the Francophone countries). States are suspicious of the resurgence of 
dividing lines (and massacres) based on nationalism, religion and ethnicity, 
and therefore refer to the historical reason for constructing the human rights 
system, implicitly accusing the indigenous peoples of being against that system 
and therefore capable of ‘barbarianism’. Evidently, a world of prejudice is 
involved in the opposition of states and dominant societies to indigenous 
populations in most areas of the world. The term ‘civilisation’ is used by 
conquerors to link the idea of the ‘other’ with concepts like ‘barbarian’ or 
‘savage’.  
The point is not to withdraw any instrument from a positive evolution of 
the international system to protect individuals’ and communities’ human 
rights. However, states’ reasons diverge from indigenous interests. There are 
many states inclined to attribute existing violence to indigenous peoples 
without considering either the state’s responsibilities in these domains or the 
reasons for isolated peoples needing to escape the world of politics where they 
have no place in order to join the way of rebellion. While the last decade of the 
twentieth century saw some progress in the organisation of the human rights 
dialogue, with the end of the Cold War, the beginning of the twenty-first 
century is showing a different tone. After September 11, 2001 and the 
implementation of anti-terrorist policies in the United States, Europe and the 
rest of the world, many indigenous organisations are now considered part of 
‘terrorist organisations’ by national authorities, as it is the case in Chile and 
Indonesia. At the UN, indigenous representatives denounce a radicalisation of 
the oppositions between states or local authorities and indigenous populations, 
especially when indigenous peoples intend to protect their territories from neo-
colonial occupation and the exploitation of their resources by multinational 
companies. In that domain, indigenous peoples would like the state authorities, 
multinational companies and global financial institutions to respect the concept 
of ‘free and prior informed consent’, and also consult them on ‘benefit-
sharing’. 
                                                          
10 The WGIP commissioned two important studies, on ‘The Permanent Sovereignty 
Over Natural Resources’, achieved by Ms Daez, second president of the WGIP 
E/CN.4/Sub.4/2003/20, and on ‘Treaties, Agreement and Other Forms of 
Constructive Arrangements’, achieved by M Martinez, third president of the same 
group (E/CN.4/Sub.2/1999/20). 
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The political context is not stabilised, and given this background it 
remains important to document and analyse the changes taking place. The 
indigenous peoples’ commitment to becoming true controllers of their destiny 
should not be understood as necessarily leading to a conflicting state of the 
world or as stimulating reactionary conservative supports (as suggested by 
Kuper).11 Like most social movements, indigenous peoples and organisations 
supported by both Marxists and the churches are crossed by ideological 
standpoints. The debate between armed or peaceful routes to achieving the 
objective of self-determination has been replaced by discussions regarding the 
legal movement, the interest and efficiency of mobilising the UN, the 
politicisation of local levels, and the organisation of civil society (with the 
creation of NGOs). In that context, the status of the individual as compared to 
collective rights is being discussed, especially by women,12 who intend to 
improve their relative position whenever they consider themselves to be 
marginalized. This, for instance, is the case with the Native Women 
Association in Canada.  
To progress the debate among state and indigenous organisations, there is 
a need to think in depth of the articulation of the two categories of individual 
and collective human rights, as Saganash and Joffe suggest.13 For them: 
It is widely recognized that Indigenous rights are predominantly 
collective in nature. This is profoundly reflected in the cultures, 
identities, worldviews, and legal systems of Indigenous peoples and 
nations. Indigenous individuals often exercise rights that flow from 
these collective rights. Therefore, protection of and respect for 
collective rights is also a vital factor for the enjoyment of basic rights 
by Indigenous individuals.14 
But as Western societies define different principles in varying ways, the 
question remains as to how to clear the political and historical backgrounds 
that lead states to stick to a conservative position such as the one described by 
Saganash and Joffe in their criticism of the United Kingdom. Saganash and 
Joffe quote the views of the United Kingdom: 
With the exception of the right to self-determination (which forms 
article one of the two international covenants on human rights), we [the 
United Kingdom] do not accept the concept of collective rights … Of 
course certain rights belonging to individuals can often be exercised 
                                                          
11 Kuper (2003). 
12 The Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues held its 3rd session in New York in 
2004, on the issue of women: see report E/C.19/2004/23 
13 Saganash and Joffe (2005), p 15.  
14 Saganash and Joffe (2005), p 12; Conceptual Framework Paper (2nd draft) by the 
Working Group on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples/Communities in Africa of the 
African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 20 December 2002, p 9: ‘The 
indigenous rights are clearly collective rights, even though they also recognize the 
foundation of individual human rights.’ 
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collectively through, for example, freedom of association, freedom of 
religion or through a collective title to property.15 
Ex-colonial states do have to deal with the legality and regime of treaties 
they signed with aboriginal peoples (wherever they did so, and often where 
they did not), and they face difficulties in interpreting these historical patterns 
in the human rights framework. 
As for the treaties in the 18th and 19th centuries, the Foreign Office 
insists that they have no relevance to international human rights law, 
which began with the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights.16 
However, it is under the auspices of the Commission on Human Rights 
that indigenous peoples have found support from the international community 
as the most vulnerable peoples, being under the threat of extinction. A new 
generation of human rights instruments is to be designed to respond to the 
variety of menaces today and to the situations in which indigenous peoples are 
currently engaged. 
The time has come for clarification. There are very few uncontacted 
peoples who live according to their own traditions and customs on their 
ancestral lands, and who claim to be respected fully. Due to the colonisation 
and decolonisation processes, and the need to fight against poverty, those 
peoples who have had to change their way of life, who have lost their 
language, and whose members have been forced to migrate to the cities or to 
other countries to get some income, are in the vast majority. But a number of 
them are determined not only to protect their cultures but also to promote 
them, even if it is through a complete reconstruction of what their cultures 
used to be. Indigenous peoples are not the icons that the media fixed in time, 
thanks to the ethnologists who carefully described their small worlds and 
defined borders of identity. They are not the ‘savages’ whose humanity could 
continue to be discussed as it was from the sixteenth to the nineteenth 
centuries, but they still suffer from racial discrimination. Nowadays, 
democratic states must adapt their legal and constitutional systems to the 
variety of populations who live in their territory, and a real effort needs to be 
made to respect various populations’ wishes to develop cross-border 
relationships and keep their people united.17 The challenge today is to imagine 
(in order to solve by anticipation) the potential conflicts that may emerge from 
the fact that indigenous communities, societies and peoples are both 
determined to preserve their traditional systems and to be active in modern 
developments. The process of differentiation among indigenous peoples that 
started a long time ago cannot be solved by the sole declaration that they form 
a people (the activist viewpoint), or by the denial of their specificities due to 
their collective identity (the states’ attitude).  
                                                          
15 Saganash and Joffe (2005), p 14; United Kingdom (2004), p 212. 
16 See Owen Bowcott, ‘A Tribal Quest’, The Guardian, 15 December 2004, Section 
G2, p 13. 
17 See Morin and Santana (2002). 
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What is the text under discussion? 
Since 1982, WGIP has served as a forum for indigenous peoples to address the 
world, and as an expert group in charge of setting new norms and standards on 
the different items it places on its agenda (development, education, human 
rights, conflicts, protection of traditional knowledge and intellectual property, 
etc.). For all indigenous representatives, the basis for the discussion is the 
Draft Declaration, as it has been written by the UN experts — that is, members 
of the WGIP — in a nine-year process involving the active participation of 
numerous states and indigenous organisations. However, according to 
interviews with the French delegates, ‘for the States, there is no precedent that 
a UN declaration be adopted without considering the changes we want to 
introduce’. This is why, in 1994, the Commission on Human Rights 
recommended the formation of a special working group to negotiate the draft, 
with a mandate to consensually accept a text to be presented to the 
Commission on Human Rights for adoption before the end of the Indigenous 
Peoples’ Decade (1995–2005). 
Every time indigenous leaders suspect the states of being about to 
introduce major changes, the leaders take care to state that the discussion is to 
develop the Draft Declaration as it was adopted in 1994 by the UN Sub-
Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Minorities.18 Together with 
their refusal to accept the consequent modifications, some states want to 
introduce what indigenous peoples call ‘the emptying activity of the meaning 
and content of the declaration’ — the ‘no change position’ (supported by the 
indigenous peoples and some states) led to a blockage. After ten fruitless years 
of being confronted by the fear that emptiness causes in the institutional world, 
the General Assembly decided to call for another decade (2005–2015) to 
encourage the states’ commitment to improve their relationship and dialogue 
with indigenous peoples. The Commission on Human Rights decided to renew 
the mandate of the WGDD for a year, though this extension was limited to 
avoid the multiplication of delaying measures.  
Yet political conditions and indigenous attitudes have slowly changed 
during the decade. After several manoevres at the initiative of the 
Scandinavian and Baltic states, supported by New Zealand, and after some 
discussions with the Sami council, an alternate text (‘CRP1’ in UN jargon) has 
been circulated, together with a table listing the differences from the original 
draft and outlining, in a third column, the changes that are introduced. This 
text was used in the 2004 session by the president-rapporteur as a basis for 
leading the discussions. A close examination reveals that it intends to 
introduce the changes desired by the most concerned powerful states, such as 
the United States, France, the United Kingdom, Canada and Australia, with an 
intention of not radically opposing the indigenous views, but rather proposing 
a coherent language so as to capture the impact of any alternative language — 
as proposed in the previous sessions — on the equilibrium of the whole Draft 
Declaration. This attitude has been criticised by a number of indigenous 
organisations, which are under the impression that the president is paying more 
                                                          
18 Morin (1992). 
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attention to the states which want to introduce radical changes in the 
declaration than to those states and indigenous organisations which want to 
preserve it as it is. As a result, the president-rapporteur (a Peruvian diplomat), 
whose capacity to build a consensus has not been proved, is being criticised by 
both states and indigenous parties. However, the WGDD mandate was 
renewed during the 61st session of the Commission on Human Rights (in April 
2005) and GRULAC, the Group of Latin American and Caribbean Countries 
which is in charge of presiding over this particular working group, is going to 
support him for yet another term. The present situation opens a new political 
landscape where the initial antagonism between indigenous peoples and states 
is being replaced by the division of the two blocks, from which several 
strategies can be fomented. 
Radical Oppositions on Core Issues: Self-determination, Land, 
Territory and Resources 
Throughout seven sessions, the president-rapporteur of the WGDD based the 
discussions between states and indigenous peoples’ organisations on the less 
controversial articles, in order to build the consensus needed for successfully 
concluding the negotiation. As a result, over ten years of negotiations, only 
two articles out of 45 have been adopted that focus on individual human rights 
(Articles 5 and 43).19 
In the 8th, 9th and 10th sessions, the president-rapporteur decided that it 
was time to examine the whole Draft Declaration in order to try to approximate 
the positions formulated by the states and indigenous representatives on the 
most controversial series of articles regarding self-determination (Articles 3, 
31, 36) and land, territory and resources (Articles 25–30). The discussions on 
these two sets of articles clearly revealed the oppositions between some states 
and most indigenous representatives. The centrality in the Draft Declaration of 
self-determination, and the provisions concerning land and territory in relation 
to the corpus of collective rights that were demanded, appeared very clearly, as 
did the need to clarify the international understanding of the articles discussed 
to push the states to evolve politically — a task that indigenous and non-
indigenous legal advisers, law teachers and consultants take very seriously, 
especially for lobbying the states. 
For the moment, the states are limiting the emergence of new 
international obligations for distinct reasons, responding on the one hand to the 
constitutional provisions they have adopted domestically, and on the other to 
the way they agree (or not) on the definition of human rights mechanisms, 
giving priority to the defence of individuals and the promotion of equality in 
society. A few states’ contrasting positions can be cited. The Latin American 
countries do not want to see an international declaration to fix 
recommendations or obligations below the standards they accepted when they 
adapted their constitutions to the recognition of a multicultural, multinational, 
                                                          
19 Article 5 states: ‘Every indigenous individual has the right to a nationality’; 
Article 43 states: ‘All the rights and freedoms recognized herein are equally 
guaranteed to male and female indigenous individuals.’ 
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multilingual society (Colombia 1991, Bolivia 1994, Brazil 1994, Ecuador 
1998, Venezuela 1999, Mexico 2002). The Security Council members — 
France, the United States, the United Kingdom, Russia and China — do not 
accept new obligations emerging from the international community, and resist 
the new forms of transnational solidarities that would force them to adjust their 
constitutional provisions. The Scandinavian states, which have already 
transferred partial sovereignty to the Sami people organised through a Sami 
transnational parliament, intend to pragmatically find the means to reconcile 
the states and indigenous peoples’ opposition, as well as the differentiated 
states’ viewpoints.20 
The Positions of the Partners/Opponents in the Negotiations 
For an outsider who observed the negotiations over five years, the project of a 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples seems to result from a 
collective action where indigenous organisations, supported by human rights 
organisations and civil society, raised the interest of the international 
community, stimulating the will to change a model of relationships with 
dominant states and societies that are based on absolute inequality, denial of 
human rights and unequal forms of citizenships. For the insider, the scene 
reveals the existence of an opposition, as the states have been engaged in this 
endeavour by the mobilisations of the international civil society rather than by 
their own will, when indigenous organisations are actively searching for other 
means to solve their situations than those provided by their respective 
countries. Some mistrust emerges from this contrasted political background, 
even though the actors have to engage themselves authentically for the 
negotiation to be achieved successfully. In the frame of globalisation studies, 
many studies have been devoted to international governance and the 
multilateral organisations since World War II, but we know very little about 
the mechanism through which a trust system could develop at the global level.  
Regarding indigenous issues, one of the problems is the fact that the 
movement, which started from the American continent, has progressively 
generalised to include Europe, Africa and Asia. Such a world expansion, 
which reveals the similarity of indigenous marginalisation on all the 
continents, has an impact on the possible definition of universal provisions, as 
the multiplication of the partners — including both states and indigenous 
representatives — dramatically increases the level of complexity. Different 
political structures and cultures coexist and lead to dialogue at the same time 
as geo-political strategies are formed on which alliances are based, and the 
states’ interests may strongly diverge from those of the indigenous peoples. 
For 30 years, the indigenous movement has consolidated its position and 
built its political authority on its capacity to foster unity. The UN and different 
international mechanisms, including the establishment of a voluntary fund to 
financially support the participation of indigenous representatives, have 
facilitated this. But the most important thing has been the indigenous leaders’ 
own capacity to encourage and channel the participation to the WGIP, to 
                                                          
20 See Bellier (2003). 
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transmit to the younger generations the know-how regarding the way to talk in 
formal situations, to address the president, to dress and be proud of being 
indigenous, without falling into the folklore to which Western societies usually 
reduce the difference of cultures. Over the last three decades, the movement 
that started in the Americas21 has been capable of opening itself, welcoming 
participation by indigenous peoples from Africa, Asia, Russia and elsewhere, 
to make visible the commonality of their interests, realising through verbal 
exchanges, direct meetings, and web networking that their situations are very 
similar, despite the huge differences that exist between peoples, regions, 
political systems and the ruling majorities.  
The activation of the Caucus system — inherited from North American 
First Nations practices — where indigenous representatives meet every day, 
before or after the informal and formal sessions, to forge a common position, 
has been extremely positive. But with the widening of the movement, and 
given the growing complexity of the topics discussed in different UN 
institutions (WGIP, WGDD, Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, WIPO, 
UNESCO, the Convention of Biological Diversity Committee of Parties, etc), 
there has been a need to strengthen the modalities of discussions, leading to the 
multiplication of regional (North America, South America, Pacific, Arctic, 
Africa, Asia) and thematic (women, conflict, environment, etc) caucuses under 
the global indigenous caucus that still represents the indigenous voice. 
Confronted with the necessity of clearing the positions, both regionally and 
thematically, at the same time as discussions evolve in the plenary sessions, 
indigenous representatives face the problem of an impossible ubiquity in terms 
of their participation in the world institutions. How can they attend 
simultaneous events (including caucuses, press conferences, meetings with the 
states’ representatives, plenary sessions, and so on) at the UN and in the capital 
with limited human and financial resources?  
As a result, an indigenous international elite has emerged, composed of 
the delegates and leaders who involve themselves more in the UN processes. 
They succeed in introducing the indigenous voice wherever they can, but they 
are at the risk of progressively losing the strength of a unity forged after 
lengthy discussions. For instance, given the blocked discussions in WGDD, 
some organisations have lost their patience and confidence that the UN 
mechanisms will have a real impact on making the situation evolve politically. 
They circulate letters and petitions to get support, and in so doing show 
indigenous divisions that bring confusion into the states, especially among 
these which want to be constructive but do not know which are the right 
interlocutors to approach. This has been obvious in the last WGDD session and 
the preparation of the 61st Commission on Human Rights. 
A number of American and Pacific indigenous organisations, led by the 
International Indian Treaty Council, called for a recess in the process so that an 
evaluation could be made in order to find the best possible way to solve the 
issue. As the letter sent on 15 March 2005 to the President of the Commission 
on Human Rights states: 
                                                          
21 See Bellier (2005); Morin (2005). 
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in order to take effective steps that would make the chances of success 
much greater … This recess will provide the Commission on Human 
Rights, beginning at this session, with the opportunity to establish, in 
full consultation with Indigenous Peoples, a new process which would 
include effective and viable mechanisms for the voices of the great 
numbers of Indigenous Peoples from around the world that are affected 
by these discussions to be heard. 
But nobody really knows how this could be done, or who would do the 
assessment. In response, a number of world indigenous organisations, 
informed on the one hand by the Tebtebba Foundation (Philippines) and the 
Sami Council (Scandinavia), and on the other by the Inuit Circumpolar 
Conference (ICC) and the Grand Council of the Crees (GCC, Canada), signed 
an online petition calling for the prolongation of the mandate in order to 
maintain the momentum that has been won through participation in UN 
mechanisms, and to maintain the pressure on the states for them to adjust their 
negotiating positions to the need to adopt a declaration. In particular, these 
organisations are contesting the process followed and find it counter-
productive. The letter written by ICC and GCC observes: 
An essential priority we have as Indigenous peoples is to maintain unity 
and solidarity within the Indigenous Caucus — or at least among an 
overwhelming majority. Therefore, it is highly divisive for the initiators 
of the March 15, 2005 letter to now propose a strategy that runs counter 
to what Indigenous peoples within and outside the Caucus are 
committed to, with no opportunity for timely discussion. 
Eventually, Canada introduced a resolution to renew the mandate of WGDD, 
for the Draft Declaration to be concluded as soon as possible, and before the 
62nd CHR. Along with Finland, Guatemala and Mexico, it did not support a US 
amendment intended to limit the next session to ten days, hence introducing an 
ultimatum to WGDD. On the side of the states also, homogeneity cannot be 
detected.  
Indeed, there are many divisions between the three categories of states. 
One category is composed of the ‘recalcitrant/obstructive’ states (so labelled 
by many indigenous organisations), which include Australia, France, New 
Zealand, the United Kingdom, the United States and Japan. Even though 
different positions can be observed on particular items, they are not inclined to 
consider indigenous peoples as autonomous peoples, and periodically demand 
a precise definition of who is going to be concerned by the Draft Declaration. 
They wish to circumscribe the international obligations of the states to promote 
national sovereignty and territorial integrity. They prefer to endorse and 
protect individual human rights, but favour the concept of freedom instead of 
rights. Therefore, they introduce an element of conditionality for interpreting 
the principle of self-determination, with a difference between internal self-
determination and external self-determination. In response to the US 
declination of internal self-determination, the French state (via the French 
delegate) proposes to introduce the notion of ‘free administration’ that is a 
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possibility under the legal regime of ‘association’. To sum up several 
negotiating positions in brief terms, these states promote a liberal view of the 
land issue, acknowledging the existence of a spiritual link with ‘Mother Earth’ 
— the generic entity symbolizing the natural relationship of a people to a 
particular place — and they accept the idea that indigenous peoples have a 
particular knowledge to be recognised for managing environmental issues. But 
they do not answer the questions of how to provide the right means to protect 
land and territories, or how to give indigenous communities collective property 
rights on the soil and sub-soil resources. They accept the notion of traditional 
customs and laws, but not that of an indigenous legal system, and they prefer 
national courts to be charged with regulating the conflicts. Intending to protect 
the rights of the third parties before conceding indigenous rights, they prefer a 
system of financial compensation to legal restitution of the indigenous lands 
and territory. For a long time, Canada has been associated with this group of 
recalcitrant states, and it is certainly due to indigenous lobbying that a political 
will to progress on the discussion on self-determination and land rights seems 
to emerge. Government changes affect the development of good relations with 
indigenous peoples. 
The second category of states is composed of the so-called ‘friendly 
states’, who regard it as a priority to adopt the Draft Declaration. This category 
includes two approaches, one associated with the states which want to support 
the Draft Declaration as it has been adopted by the Sub-Commission, and one 
associated with states which want to introduce what they call ‘positive 
changes’. The first approach reflects the GRULAC position, including some 
states which support the indigenous side and want to be seen to be active on 
this line, like Mexico and Guatemala, and the states which keep their distance, 
such as Brazil, Chili and Colombia — an attitude that reflects the differential 
impact of indigenous peoples in political decisions according to their 
demographic weight. Among GRULAC, the states that adopted new 
constitutions during the 1990s in favour of the cultural diversity and the 
importance of indigenous roots to the national identity have progressively 
affirmed their voice. They do not want to see international provisions 
undermining the compromise passed at the national levels. They use the 
expression ‘indigenous peoples’; they admit the existence of indigenous 
territories and legal systems; and they do not question the possible emergence 
of collective rights, even though they do not foster their implementation at the 
regional, national and local levels. Together with North America, they are 
engaged in the Organization of American States’ declaration for the rights of 
indigenous peoples, Cuba being excluded from the OAS but participating to 
the UN. 
The second group of ‘friendly states’ defends a form of alternate 
integrated language to force the renegotiation of the Draft Declaration and 
oblige the recalcitrant states to concessions, as well as to force the indigenous 
organisations to quit the ‘no change position’. Among these states, led by a 
group of Scandinavian and Baltic countries, there may exist differences 
according to political regime, but the fact is that some of them — like Norway, 
Denmark, Finland and Sweden — are already engaged in negotiation and 
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political agreements with the Sami people, and they want to use their capacity 
to develop a positive dialogue in the region to enforce changes in the Draft 
Declaration in order to make it acceptable, at least to a majority of the parties, 
if not to all of them. Due to its changing majority in government, New Zealand 
has recently joined that group, quitting the recalcitrant states group with which 
it was associated for years. Together, they want to introduce a clarification of 
the provisions with regard to the objectives, bringing light to the individual or 
collective characteristic of a particular right and specifying the idea that 
indigenous peoples do not need a special right but rather a general one. They 
are inclined to develop consistency with international human rights 
instruments, and distinguish the rights of indigenous peoples and the 
obligations of the states.  
The third group includes the states that I consider to be ‘indifferent but 
not neutral’, for whom indigenous issues are potentially explosive and kept 
under control by a denial of recognition. It means essentially African and 
Asian states which are not attending the WGDD sessions, even though their 
name is shown on the table. This sign of indifference may be due to a lack of 
human resources to attend all UN meetings, and/or indigenous issues may not 
be a priority for the world’s sake. But since these states attend the Human 
Rights Council, and can therefore use their voting rights to block a declaration 
they would not have discussed in WGDD, this selective attendance is a sign 
that they are not neutral. Indigenous peoples’ representatives, especially those 
from Asia and Africa, regularly complain of the missing link with their 
respective country delegates, since they cannot use the opportunity to meet 
them at the UN to clear their views and try to solve their many problems — as 
can their ‘brothers and sisters’ (a terminology they use among themselves) 
with the American states. It is a sign of their political maturity that lobbying 
has become an important occupation for many indigenous delegates. When 
they cannot meet their states’ diplomats in the UN session, they must look to 
meeting them wherever they are. 
Shifting Positions: Potential for Adoption or Rupture 
For an anthropologist whose methodology is based on participant observation, 
it is extremely difficult to foresee the future; however, the momentum that has 
occurred in the indigenous movement over the last decades is in itself an 
indicator of how things can develop.  
As mentioned already, two years ago, negotiations were accelerated to 
have the Draft Declaration adopted before the end of the first decade (2005). 
As nothing has been adopted on time, a second decade called ‘Partnership in 
Action’ has now been declared for the indigenous peoples, with the intention 
of transforming words into actions. The perception that an effort must be made 
by the states seems to be shared, and they often reassure the indigenous 
peoples’ representatives about their good intentions. But this seems largely 
rhetorical, at least where it concerns the Draft Declaration. Making an effort to 
conclude the negotiations does not indicate who is going to make the main 
compromise or what it will be based upon. Some discouragement can be seen 
on indigenous sides when states keep repeating the same reservations they 
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have expressed since the beginning, without considering the changes that have 
been introduced during the last decade in favour of the indigenous voice 
through other platforms of the international system.  
Contrasting with the states’ fragmented knowledge, as demonstrated by 
the diplomats who act under instructions of their governments, indigenous 
representatives retain strong memories of any progress achieved in the world 
legal organisations regarding their specificity. This is due to the fact that they 
engage themselves directly in any world discussion of interest for them, and 
have taken to circulating information and sending reports to each other so that 
a cumulative capacity can be forged. They bring into the negotiations on the 
Draft Declaration language coming from other legal or semi-legal sources — 
such as, for instance, the language of the only international instrument that is 
applicable to Indigenous and Tribal peoples (the ILO Convention 169) and the 
wording of the provisions concerning indigenous peoples in other Conventions 
(such as the Convention on Biodiversity or the Convention to Eliminate 
Racism and Discrimination). Their arguments also refer to semantic evolutions 
that figure in the world summit declarations on the earth (Rio de Janeiro 1992, 
Johannesburg 2002), on water (from Stockholm to Kyoto 1972–2003), on the 
information society (Geneva 2003, Tunis 2005), and so on. Given the states’ 
lack of memory and incapacity to relate the formulation of new norms to other 
consequences, indigenous representatives try to work consistently to remind 
states that international norms and standards have to be adapted to the changes 
in global life, economy and governance. In contrast, the states seem to stick to 
their domestic issues, and more often than not express their feeling that the ‘no 
change position’ adopted by the majority of indigenous organisations does not 
allow them to move towards a ‘positive’ rewriting of the Draft Declaration — 
‘positive’ in their mind meaning less favourable to indigenous peoples or to 
particular groups. 
Now the situation is such that the indigenous movement, which takes its 
strength from the cohesion its organisations present in front of the states, has to 
work out the modalities to reconcile the leaders who despair of getting any 
consensus with the states in a reasonable period, with those willing to defend 
the core of the Draft Declaration: self-determination, land rights and control 
over the resources. They are confronted with deciding among themselves what 
could be the right strategy to win a declaration without losing the fundamental 
rights they claim. In the UN’s terminology — as, for instance, formulated by 
Mexico in the 61st CHR — the necessity is to ‘bring positions as close as 
possible’. This country proposed (as others did in former years on other issues) 
to hold a workshop ‘to build bridges of dialogue for new approaches to the 
toughest and most problematic issues contained in the draft declaration’. This 
country may be thinking in terms of building bridges between states and 
indigenous organisations. However, it might also be required to help 
indigenous organisations to solve their differences in approach through ad hoc 
meetings, separated from the negotiating sessions which capture their 
attention, and the rhythm of which, provided by the agenda, does not allow 
time enough to discuss the collective strategy. The weekend which is usually 
devoted to that purpose, before any formal session takes place in Geneva 
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(CHR, WGIP, WGDD) or in New York (Permanent Forum on Indigenous 
Issues), and which is supported by the World Council of Churches that is quite 
active among the IPs, is not sufficient to clarify the issues at stake, to advance 
a coordinated indigenous voice in front of the states’ strategies to divide the 
movement. But to organise extra sessions, financial means are required to 
bring together people from all the continents, provide them with translation, 
and to give them time and support to clear their respective views. The support 
given by a technical organisation like the Indigenous Peoples’ Center for 
Documentation, Research and Information (DoCip) and several human rights 
organisations needs to be supplemented by states’ contributions — however, 
very few of these have been forthcoming. 
Conclusion 
As compared to 30 years ago, the situation has changed for indigenous 
peoples, and some states among those most concerned by the problem have 
developed a system of dialogue with indigenous organisations in an 
unprecedented fashion (like Canada, Norway, Denmark and Guatemala). This 
is the fruit of the capacity shown by the indigenous organisations to send 
responsible representatives, trained in national and international law, 
experienced in participating to the UN meetings and international settings, and 
capable of expressing themselves in several languages, to talk with the World 
Bank and to use all kinds of support, including support from the churches.  
 But all the regions of the world and all the indigenous peoples are not 
capable of doing this. Most of them are in the process of building their 
international political capacity, and participation in UN meetings where 
concrete exchanges of know-how can take place is a key factor. For instance, 
compared with their American fellows, African indigenous representatives are 
just beginning to work at an international level, without having enjoyed all the 
existing possibilities to understand the international human rights 
developments in which they have not yet been trained. Like many other 
indigenous peoples, they are also confronted with the difficulties posed by 
multilingualism and the use of a dominant language. Francophone indigenous 
peoples are lost in the international world, which uses English as a medium for 
communication — even though French is acknowledged (like Arabic, Chinese, 
English, Russian and Spanish) as a UN official language.  
In global terms, the linguistic international background does not fit 
comfortably with indigenous capacities, given that indigenous mother tongues 
are never used for declarations, and indigenous peoples are obliged to express 
themselves in the official language of their country and in one of the official 
languages of the UN. Those of them who had been — willingly or not — 
trained in English-speaking schools have a relative advantage compared with 
those who have only attended French schools. That is also due to the number 
of French indigenous speakers who, until recently (when African indigenous 
peoples started to move), were in an absolute minority when it came to 
participating in UN negotiations as compared with Spanish- and English-
speaking peoples. The same is true for the Arabic and Chinese speakers, who 
remain marginal for several reasons, among them the fact that most of the 
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states which represent these languages do not recognise their indigenous 
peoples or do not allow their ‘national minorities’ to attend the UN sessions. 
The situation is a little different for the Russian speakers, who have been able 
to attend such meetings since 1991, but who do not constitute a large group of 
people. 
Notwithstanding these difficulties, indigenous leaders and representatives 
from all the continents manage to get funded by the UN Voluntary Fund. They 
succeed in learning a few words of English, to obtain support from their 
indigenous fellows and, like others, involve themselves completely in ‘UN 
business’. The UN’s Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights and 
the European Commission encourage their involvement, with different 
programs being tailored for them. Such a process, which is progressing slowly, 
through the identification of the leaders and the inclusion of individuals as 
representatives of larger groups and communities, is not uncontroversial, as it 
questions the representativeness of the states as interlocutors; however, it 
seems to be adapted to the ways indigenous peoples select their 
representatives. Nevertheless, to avoid a growing gap between the indigenous 
elites (sometimes expatriated) and the people within the communities, the UN 
and the support organisations who finance indigenous peoples’ training now 
pay more attention to the means of ensuring feedback occurs at the local levels 
in order to limit the progressive isolation of the newly trained leaders. 
The juncture with the academic world is demonstrated by the many 
congresses, symposia and conference where indigenous peoples now 
participate along with researchers and academics. The rise of the internet has 
enabled the circulation of different information, the new media being equally 
used by the activists who post their declarations and by the researchers who 
consult indigenous people, as well as the institutional and support 
organisations’ websites. Raising awareness among the political class is still to 
occur in a number of countries (such as France), where indigenous issues are 
not considered a priority. Deprived of visibility within their own society, 
indigenous peoples are barely able to be associated to state delegations, and 
their representation in liberal democracies remains problematic.  
The fact is that concentrating on the establishment of international 
standards has a double effect on the indigenous movement. On the one hand, it 
creates a group of indigenous experts22 who know what the international 
systems are, understand how epistemic communities are forged, and also 
realise the need to specialise in sectional issues such as intellectual property, 
the environment, the World Bank programs, and so on, and to work on 
communication strategy. The relationship between these leaders and those 
acting within individual countries still requires a better understanding, since 
the Western system of political representation does not function there. But this 
                                                          
22 The states (eight) and indigenous (eight) members of the Permanent Forum on 
Indigenous Issues are called ‘experts’; the same title is given to the five (non-
indigenous) members of the UN’s WGIP who are appointed by the Sub-
Committee for the Promotion and Protection of Minorities, being selected to 
represent the world’s regions (Africa, America, Asia, Western and Eastern 
Europe). 
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movement is inscribed on to the pattern of an evolution of the global system 
that does not seem to be questioned. From the indigenous viewpoint, even 
though a sudden change would be welcome, standard-setting takes time, and 
what is important is to be involved as partners in the negotiation to gain 
credibility, legitimacy and strength. On the other hand, the first necessity is to 
bring changes in the places where indigenous peoples and communities are 
living, and sometimes dying. And it is extremely difficult to foster positive 
changes for improving their life conditions without an appropriate international 
instrument. The Draft Declaration would be the first step towards establishing 
a more legally binding instrument, such as a convention.  
The fact is that local temporalities are not like global ones. The 
‘indigenous camp’ expresses a sense of emergency that states do not seem to 
incorporate in their agendas. States are not ready to engage in the writing of a 
convention. This explains why states have slowed down the discussions on the 
Draft Declaration, and why a number of indigenous organisations do not 
believe in the political process. They call upon the UN to accelerate the 
process, otherwise there will be no more indigenous peoples left to give rights 
to. 
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